World War II marked the inception of an entirely new brand of warfare. No longer could commanders think in only two dimensions, the air war added a deadly third. And it was from this "third dimension" that Allied forces penetrated Hitler's "Fortress Europe" and rained the devastation that ultimately led to the capitulation of the once venerated Reich. But even as B-17s and B-24s fought their way through Europe's flak-filled skies, the real victory was being won at home, on the drawing boards and assembly lines of the aircraft designers and manufacturers.

Brigadier General Billy Mitchell could easily be considered "the father of strategic bombing" but even his incredible foresight could not envision the full scope that bombing would attain. The bombers that Mitchell tested against the Ostfriesland were a far cry from the late war Superfortress, but the theory remained the same. The Boeing B-9 and Martin B-l0 were the first direct forefathers in the design of the modern bomber, and proved to be just steps in the evolution that led to the B-17 Flying Fortress, the B-24 Liberator, the B-29 Superfortress, and beyond.

Most of the greatest technological accomplishments of the war occurred in the aircraft industry. Mass expansion, subcontracting, and workload sharing were all standard in an effort to get as many planes into the war as possible. Quality, however, was at least as - if not more - important as quantity, and it was with this in mind that the aircraft builders formed the AWPC (Aircraft War Production Council). Under the assumption that "eight heads are better than one", the members of the AWPC pooled their trade secrets in order to insure that the army had the best planes possible.(1)

And what planes they were, each new aircraft slightly better than the last. For long range strategic bombing, the work load fell on the shoulders of the legendary stalwart B-17, and the highly adaptable B-24. These bombers, both of prewar design, were constantly being modified and re-engineered to upgrade their performance to keep them at the front lines of the ever-shifting tides of war.

The true litmus test of the advances in the bomber aircraft industry was the B-29 Superfortress. The Superfort, the only bomber to be developed and built exclusively for the war and to see extensive action in it, was truly an impressive display of engineering, "imagineering", and problem solving. (2) The industry had once again made the "ultimate" bomber. Bigger, faster, and stronger, the B-29 was by far the most advanced bomber yet created. The aircraft industry, through complex organization and teamwork, had once again supplied the Army Air Corps with superior equipment. Although the brave men who did the flying and fighting deserve the lion's share of the credit, it could be argued that the war was actually won on the drawing boards of Seattle and San Diego.

The greatest battle plane of its time, and perhaps of all time, was conceived aboard a battleship -its mother an unknown necessity, and its father a sailor. As it is with most happy illegitimacies, the birth occurred before the advent of the necessity -(which would come to be known as) World War II. Had this birth not happened, the course of recent history might have been tragically different. (3)

It would probably be unreasonable to attribute all of the inception of the strategic bomber program to Brigadier General "Billy" Mitchell, but certainly no one contributed more. The time was just after the First World War, and Mitchell watched as the U.S. Army Air Corps, the branch of the Armed Forces he considered the most important, was slowly being dismantled. The countless letters of objection Mitchell composed and sent to his superiors went unheeded. In fact, he later discovered that most of his requests wound up in a special section of the war department basement known as "the flying trash pile." (4) Mitchell was finally allowed to appear before congress and voice his opinion, in doing so launch his campaign, a campaign that began with words and ended with bombs.(5)

While before congress, Mitchell challenged the formidable United States Navy and its deep traditions head-on. Mitchell stated boldly that the days of the battleship were numbered, the Navy was no longer capable of defending the U.S. coastline, and that from the air he could "sink any ship in existence." Mitchell went on to show how 1,000 heavy bombers, which were infinitely more effective, in his view of warfare, could be purchased at the cost of a single battleship. Mitchell's concluding remarks blatantly challenged the navy. "They look with abhorrence -all navies do- on a system of attack against their vessels by airplanes because it will mean eventually the diminution or entire elimination of their strength on the water, and many think that helping aviation will diminish naval strength." (6)

Mitchell's remarks were splashed all over the headlines the next day as the press ran wild with his bold statements. Congress reacted by instructing the somewhat reluctant navy to provide old derelict ships to put Mitchell's statements to the test. Mitchell now had his chance, but his makeshift provisional air brigade was pathetically short of men and equipment. There were no bomber pilots with World War I experience left in the service, the Martin MB2 Bombers he wanted were slow in production, and there were no bombs currently available powerful enough to pierce ship armor. Mitchell worked frantically and after a few practice runs, his crew was ready for their first formal test on June 20, 1921.

The first target provided was the captured German U. Boat U-117. Flights of navy FL5's armed with 165 pound bombs sent U-117 to the bottom in a scant sixteen minutes. (7) Later that month, a 3-wave attack against the destroyer G-102 yielded similar results, sinking her in nineteen minutes. (8) A sterner test awaited Mitchell in the form of the German light cruiser Frankfurt. After navy technicians reported, almost gloatingly, that early strafing runs had done little damage, Mitchell sent in his heavy MB-2's and their 600 pound bombs, which had the Frankfurt under the waves in thirty-five minutes. (9)

Mitchell's final victory was won against the "unsinkable" Ostfriesland, the 27,000 ton German battle ship. After inclement weather postponed the attack, the Ostfriesland withstood direct hits from 1100 pound bombs and two hits from one ton bombs before a near miss by a 2000 pounder created a swell that sent 30,000 tons of water into the air and flopped the Ostfriesland onto her back and to the sea bed. Elapsed time twenty-two minutes. (10)

To many, Mitchell's victory was complete, and he was viewed as an American hero. Still, his propaganda onslaught continued with a massive fly-over of New York city at 8,000 feet accompanied by a release to the press on how: "if those planes were German, New York City would be laid in ruins." (11) Additional tests marked the end of the old Alabama, New Jersey, and Virginia. Unfortunately, Mitchell's sweeping public relations victory did little to convert the "establishment" as despite his impressive showing, the U.S. Government refused to commit to a separate air arm with the all important heavy bomber force. Instead, it was decided by General John J. Pershing, as head of the army-navy board that "the battle ship will continue as the bulwark of the nations sea defenses." (12)

There the situation rested until the spring of 1928 when a spirited conversation ensued between Joseph M. Reeves, captain of the aircraft carrier Langley and the visiting Clairmont L. Egtvedt, vice president of Boeing. Reeves told Egtvedt flatly that "the airplane is not a dreadnought, no airplane flying now can ever be compared with a battleship." Egtvedt saw this statement as a challenge to him and his company to make it no longer valid.(13) This task was a gigantic one indeed, and numerous problems stood in Egtvedt's way. The first of which was the current "momentum" of the armed forces toward the battleship. Other more subtle problems included:

The nation, in 1928, was reaching the climax of its jazz age joyride and its mood hardly encompassed the purchase of weapons of war. This was reflected in an isolationist congress which proceeded to scuttle the League of Nations and to cut itself off from Europe. The "War to end all wars " was over and America, secure in a splendid two ocean isolation, could lavish its adulation upon "Lucky Lindy" without at all being aware what it was that the young pilot had proved. (14)

Over and above these many difficulties lay the obvious problem of actually creating an airplane that could rival the awesome power of a battleship.

Egtvedt took a seemingly impossible challenge back to Boeing. Ironically, the answer to the challenge did not come from extensive research on bomber design. It lay in a series of new commercial design developments that Boeing had started work on at this point.

The first step was Egtvedt and Edward Hubbard's idea to design an all metal monoplane for commercial use. A cantilevered wing construction was decided upon to reduce drag caused by support struts and wires. A smooth skin design was also chosen to reduce drag. The result: the highly successful Boeing Model 200 "Monomail". This sleek low winged monoplane called "the first modern air transport" carried with it many innovations including the "drag-ring" cowling to reduce air resistance, and retractable landing gear.(15) An offspring of the model 200 design was the Model 214 or B-9 bomber. The B-9, almost 100 mph faster than the current U.S. "Keystone" bomber, could, in fact, overtake many of the fighters of the day.(16) The B-9 failed to get a government contract, though, when Martin vastly improved their B-10 while still managing to underbid Boeing.

Despite this setback, Boeing remained on the cutting edge with its release of the Model 247 commercial airliner. The 247, like its predecessor the Monomail, was more advanced than anything in the air. Innovations included 550 horsepower supercharged Wasp engines, hydraulic Standard propellers, and rubber deicer boots. The 247 topped off at around 200 mph and a ceiling of 27,000 feet.(17) For his efforts, William E Boeing was awarded the Guggenheim medal for "successful pioneering and achievement in air craft manufacture and transportation ."(18)

Boeing had, almost unwittingly, designed the basis of a better bomber. The rugged 247 could carry more, farther, faster. It would be up to the U.S. government to determine when this technology would be used toward serving military needs.

In July 1933, the material division at Wright Field undertook an engineering study to determine the feasibility of developing a long range bomber capable of carrying a ton over 5000 miles. Thus being able to defend Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama without having to refuel. This study was entitled Air Corps' "Project A" .By June of 1934 Boeing was awarded a preliminary contract under the terms of Project A. The fruit of this experimental undertaking was the mammoth XBLR-1 (eXperimental Bomber Long Range model 1, later simply the XB-15). Although the design of the B-15 was aerodynamically sound, the aircraft was woefully underpowered. When it was completed in 1937, there were no existing aircraft engines that could provide the power needed to maximize the XB-15's performance. The comparatively modest 1000 horsepower Allison power plants available could only manage 190 mph and their incredible gas consumption limited range.(19)

Even while the XB-15 was being engineered, a circular arrived from Wright Field on August 8, 1934. It was composed of the specifications required for the next production (as opposed to the "experimental" as Project A called for) bomber. Several manufacturers, including Boeing, were invited to submit bids. The new specs called for a "multi-engined" bomber capable of carrying a ton of bombs 2,000 miles at 200 miles an hour. The approved design would win its firm an order for as many as 220 planes.(20)

Boeing immediately began work on Model 299, the new design combining all the best features of the model 247, and the still-in-production XB-15. After devoting nearly all resources to the project the prototype was completed in July 1935. The 299 roughly split the difference in size between the XB-15 and model 247, and bore a striking family resemblance to the XB-15. The 299 flew for the first time on July 28, 1935. Legend has it that a Seattle newsman, seeing the 299 (which was at the time the largest land plane built) for the first time exclaimed, "why, it's a flying fortress," and so a name -and a legend- were born. (21)

The Y1B-17 (as it was designated) surpassed all expectations for speed, range, and ceiling, and garnered high praises for its smoothness and "handle-ability" from anyone who flew it. (22)

A tragic pilot-failure related crash of the prototype 299 just days before the final testing almost spelled the end of the whole program. Critics began calling the 299 "too much for one man to handle." AFFGHQ, though, was undaunted, and although they gave a major 133 plane contract to Douglas for its much cheaper twin engined B-18 bomber (a plane that served its days as a trainer and on coastal patrol duty), they did issue appropriation for 13 YB-17's. This limited order actually proved to be a bit of a godsend for Boeing, as the B-17's were being provided to the Army at a loss. (23)

The early service years of the B-17 were spent mostly on "good will flights" and publicity stunts. Truly the flying fortress was "a bomber without a cause" tethered to the coastline by a "100 mile radius of operations" order. (24) It was not until the skies darkened over Europe, and bombs fell on Pearl Harbor that the B-17's role in warfare became evident.